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ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL: THE
SUPREME COURT’S DISTORTED
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT OF 1978
Jessica Di Palma
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA)1 to establish federal standards governing state-court
child-custody cases involving Indian children.2 The statute attempted
to remedy the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their
biological parents by nontribal public and private agencies, by
creating “minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families . . . .”3 Most Americans had likely never
heard of this statute, until a highly publicized child custody case
thrust the ICWA into the media spotlight.4
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,5 a case that received more
publicity for its soap opera-like facts and heart-wrenching drama
than for its impact on the law, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
held that the ICWA does not apply in cases where the biological
 J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English, University
of California, Santa Barbara, June 2008. I would like to thank Professor Seagull Song for her
guidance and feedback on this Comment. Thank you to the talented and dedicated editors and
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Finally, I am forever grateful to my parents and
sister for their unconditional love and support.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006).
2. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. See also Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 89 A.L.R. 5th 195 (2013) (analyzing cases
where the courts have applied the ICWA to child custody proceedings).
4. This dramatic legal saga has been a continuing focus of the media. See, e.g., Adoption
Controversy: Battle over Baby Veronica, DR. PHIL (June 6, 2013), http://www.drphil.com/shows
/show/1895 (featuring Veronica’s adoptive parents telling Dr. Phil’s nationwide audience their
emotional story of losing custody of Veronica); Veronica May Not Be Saved, ABC NEWS 4
(July 26, 2012), http://www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved
(explaining that updates about the legal saga were posted on a “Save Veronica” Facebook page).
5. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
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“parent abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had
custody of the child.”6
A superficial read of this case and the media reports surrounding
it would likely lead to the conclusion that this holding involves a
straightforward case of statutory interpretation applied cautiously to
a set of unfortunate facts.7 But with a deeper examination of the
ICWA’s text, structure, and legislative purpose, it becomes clear that
the Court oversimplified the law and overlooked the legislative
purpose behind this statute. As Justice Sotomayor observed in her
dissenting opinion, “[i]n truth, however, the path from the text of the
[ICWA] to the result the Court reaches is anything but clear, and its
result anything but right.”8
This Comment examines Adoptive Couple’s interpretation of the
ICWA in detail. Part II of this Comment presents the historical
framework behind the ICWA’s enactment and an overview of the
statutory provisions at issue in this case. Part III outlines the facts
and procedural history that led to the Court’s decision. Part IV
summarizes and compares the Court’s conflicting majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part V argues that this case was
wrongly decided because the Court ignored the legislative intent of
the ICWA and distorted its plain language to reach what the majority
felt was the correct moral result. This Comment further argues that
the Court’s results-oriented holding unnecessarily complicates the
straightforward language of the ICWA, which will result in many
unintended consequences.
II. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978
Pursuant to its enumerated power under the Indian Commerce
Clause of the Constitution,9 Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 to
establish minimum federal standards applicable to state-court
child-custody proceedings involving Indian children.10
6. Id. at 2557.
7. See id. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“A casual reader of the Court’s opinion could
be forgiven for thinking this is an easy case, one in which the text of the applicable statute clearly
points the way to the only sensible result.”).
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”).
10. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557. Under the ICWA, an Indian child is defined as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is

ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL

2014]

ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL

9/25/2014 4:07 PM

525

Before Adoptive Couple, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield11 was the first and only Supreme Court case to address
the ICWA.12 There, the Court explained that the ICWA was the
“product of rising concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences to
Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of
Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or
foster care placement usually in non-Indian homes.”13 In 1969 and
1974, the Association on American Indian Affairs conducted studies
showing “that 25 to 35 [percent] of all Indian children had been
separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster
care, or institutions.”14
In 1974, these findings were presented to the legislature in
Senate hearings, and further testimony was presented in hearings in
1977 and 1978 on the bill that eventually became the ICWA.15 This
testimony provided the basis for the congressional findings expressly
stated in § 1901 of the ICWA.16 Congress found “that an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public
and private agencies . . . .”17 The ICWA thus “seeks to protect the
rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”18 The
statute does so by establishing numerous protections of the rights of

eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006).
11. 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (holding that an Indian couple’s voluntary placement of their two
Indian children with non-Indian adoptive parents violated the ICWA).
12. See Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-and-a-Half Ways To Destroy
Indian Law, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 46, 49 (2013), http://
www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/111/Zug.pdf.
13. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32.
14. Id. (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 15 (1974) (statement of
William Byler)).
15. Id. at 33–34 (citing Hearing on S. 1214 before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Public
Lands of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. (1978); Hearing on S. 1214
before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977)).
16. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006).
17. Id. § 1901(4).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978).
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Indian parents so that “where possible, an Indian child should remain
in the Indian community.”19
Three provisions of the ICWA are particularly relevant to this
case, two of which are found in § 1912.20 Section 1912 of the ICWA
sets out procedural and substantive standards applicable to “any
involuntary proceeding in a [s]tate court,”21 including involuntary
termination of parental rights proceedings—the type of proceeding at
issue in Adoptive Couple.22 Specifically, under § 1912(d), “Any party
seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to an Indian child under state law” must demonstrate
that “active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”23 Under
§ 1912(f), a state court may not involuntarily terminate parental
rights to an Indian child “in the absence of a determination,
supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of
the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”24 Finally, where
Indian children are separated from their biological parents by foster
care or adoption, § 1915(a) sets forth a list of preferred adoptive
placements for the child.25
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a four-year-old child, named Veronica
Rose—referred to as “Baby Girl” by the Court—who is 1.2 percent
Cherokee Indian and therefore classified as an Indian under the
ICWA.26 Veronica is the biological child of Christy Maldonado,27

19. Id.
20. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1912.
22. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
24. Id. § 1912(f).
25. Id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a
member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other
Indian families.”).
26. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2557 n.1.
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who is primarily Hispanic, and Dusten Brown,28 a registered member
of the Cherokee Nation.29 In January 2009, one month after their
engagement, Maldonado told Brown that she was pregnant with
Veronica.30 After Brown issued an ultimatum, telling Maldonado that
he would not provide financial support to her or the baby until they
were married, the couple’s relationship became strained; Maldonado
ended the engagement in May 2009.31
One month after that, Maldonado issued an ultimatum of her
own, asking Brown—via text message—whether he would rather
pay child support or relinquish his parental rights.32 Brown sent back
a text message, telling Maldonado that he would give up his parental
rights.33 According to Maldonado, that was the last time she heard
from Brown.34
Soon after, Maldonado decided to give Baby Veronica up for
adoption.35 Working with an attorney and a private adoption agency,
Maldonado chose Matt and Melanie Capobianco, non-Indians living
in South Carolina, to adopt Veronica.36 The Capobiancos37 provided
financial support for Maldonado until Veronica was born on
September 15, 2009.38 The next day, Maldonado signed the adoption
papers.39 The Capobiancos then returned to South Carolina with
27. See Christy Maldonado, Baby Veronica Belongs with Her Adoptive Parents, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-12/opinions/40529306_1_mattand-melanie-adoptive-parents-melanie-capobianco.
28. See Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to Weigh
In, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/baby-veronicas-lovedones-wait-for-the-supreme-court-to-weigh-in/2013/04/14/7138b5f0-a526-11e2-a8e25b98cb59187f_story.html.
29. The Court’s opinion refers to Maldonado as “Birth Mother” and Brown as “Birth
Father.” Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Maldonado, supra note 27
35. For a first-person account of her reasons for making the “most difficult decision” of her
life, see id.
36. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. It should also be noted that during the adoption
proceedings, Maldonado’s attorney contacted the Cherokee Nation to inquire whether Brown was
a formally registered member. Id. But because “[t]he inquiry letter misspelled [Brown’s] first
name and incorrectly stated his birthday,” the Cherokee Nation was unable to provide
confirmation that Brown was indeed a registered member. Id.
37. Maldonado, supra note 27.
38. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
39. Id.
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Veronica, where they began adoption proceedings in the South
Carolina Family Court.40 During the first four months of Veronica’s
life, Dusten Brown “made no meaningful attempts to assume his
responsibility of parenthood.”41
Approximately four months after Veronica was born, the
Capobiancos served Brown with notice of the pending adoption,
which was the first time that either they or Maldonado had notified
Brown of the adoption proceedings.42 “Brown signed the papers
stating that he accepted service and that he was ‘not contesting the
adoption.’”43 Brown later admitted that he believed by signing the
papers he relinquished his parental rights to Maldonado, not to the
Capobiancos.44 Soon after signing the papers, Brown hired a lawyer
who subsequently initiated court proceedings to stay Veronica’s
adoption.45 In these proceedings, Brown testified that he did not
consent to the adoption, and he petitioned for custody of Veronica.46
In September 2011, following a trial, the Family Court denied
the Capobiancos’ petition for adoption and awarded Brown custody
of then two-year-old Veronica.47 The court held that the Capobiancos
“had not carried the heightened burden under § 1912(f) of proving
that Veronica would suffer serious emotional or physical damage if
[Brown] had custody.”48 Veronica was officially placed in his
custody on December 31, 2011—the first time that she met her
biological father.49
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
Family Court’s decision to deny the adoption petition and to award
custody to Brown.50 The court held that both ICWA § 1912(d) and

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2558–59. During this time, the Cherokee Nation confirmed that Brown was indeed
a registered member, and therefore Baby Veronica qualified as an “Indian Child” under the
ICWA. Id. at 2559 n.2. See also supra Part II (explaining the history of the ICWA, as well as its
relevance and application to Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl).
46. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552 (S.C. 2012).
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§ 1912(f) barred the termination of Brown’s parental rights.51 First,
the court concluded that Brown qualified as a “parent” under the
ICWA’s definition of this term.52 Next, the court held that under
§ 1912(d), the Capobiancos had not shown that “active efforts [had]
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.”53 Further, the
court held that under § 1912(f), the Capobiancos had not met the
steep burden of proving that Brown’s custody of Veronica would
“result in serious emotional or physical harm to her beyond a
reasonable doubt.”54 On January 4, 2013, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.55
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Alito reversed the
South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision, holding that even if
Brown met the ICWA’s definition of “parent,” neither § 1912(f) nor
§ 1912(d) barred the termination of his parental rights because those
provisions do not apply when the “relevant parent never had custody
of the child.”56 The Court further held that while the congressional
policy behind the statute was to “preserve the cultural identity and
heritage of Indian tribes,” the ICWA was not meant to “put certain
vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an
ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian.”57
Working in reverse textual order, the Court began its
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions with § 1912(f). The
Court explained that § 1912(f) conditions the involuntary termination
of parental rights on a showing regarding the merits of “continued
51. Id. at 562–63.
52. Id. at 560 n.18.
53. Id. at 562.
54. Id. at 562–63.
55. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013). See also Robert Barnes, Supreme
Court to Examine Indian Child Welfare Act Requirements in Adoption Dispute, WASH. POST,
Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-examine-indian-childwelfare-act-requirements-in-adoption-case/2013/01/04/b3a0cb44-56b1-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc
_story.html (reporting that the Supreme Court agreed to review the ICWA requirements in the
case involving Veronica).
56. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
57. Id. at 2565.
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custody of the child by the parent.”58 The Court cited the Oxford
English Dictionary’s definition of “continued”—meaning “carried on
or kept up . . . without interruption or breach of connection”—and
therefore concluded “the adjective ‘continued’ plainly refers to a preexisting state.”59 Thus, under this reading of “continued custody,”
Brown should never have been able to invoke the protection of
§ 1912(f) in the lower court proceedings because he did not have
legal or physical custody of Veronica when the adoption proceedings
began.60
The majority next addressed § 1912(d), holding that similar to
the word “continuing” in § 1912(f), this provision “applies only in
cases where an Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by
the termination of the parent’s [existing] rights.”61 Citing to the
dictionary definition of “breakup”—meaning the “discontinuance of
a relationship”—the Court concluded that for there to be a
“breakup,” there must have been a preexisting relationship.62 The
Court explained that this interpretation of the provision conforms to
Congress’s intent to prevent the unwarranted removal of Indian
children from an existing family unit.63 But it would be “unusual to
apply § 1912(d) in the context of an Indian parent who abandoned a
child prior to birth and who never had custody of the child.”64
Finally, the Court addressed § 1915(a), which lists the
“preferences for the adoptive placement of an Indian child.”65 The
Court held that § 1915(a)’s preferences do not apply “in cases where
no alternative party had formally sought to adopt the child.”66 The
Court further explained that logically, there is “simply no
‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party . . . under § 1915(a) has
come forward.”67 The Court therefore concluded that because the
Capobiancos were the only party who “formally sought to adopt”
58. Id. at 2557–58 (emphasis added) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006)).
59. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (citing COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 909 (1981 reprint of 1971 ed.)).
60. Id. at 2562.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 235 (3d ed. 1992)).
63. Id. at 2563.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2564–65.
66. Id. at 2564.
67. Id.
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Veronica, the § 1915(a) adoption preferences did not apply.68 Section
1915(a) did not apply to Brown because he did not seek to adopt
Veronica.69 Rather, Brown’s main argument to the South Carolina
Family Court was that his parental rights should not be terminated.70
Further, § 1915(a) did not apply because neither Veronica’s paternal
grandparents nor a member of the Cherokee Nation sought to adopt
Veronica.71 Therefore, the Court held that when the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that § 1915(a)’s adoption preferences would
have applied had the court terminated Brown’s parental rights, the
court failed to address this “critical limitation” on the applicability of
§ 1915(a): that this section’s “rebuttable adoption preferences” only
apply when an alternative party seeks to adopt the Indian child.72
B. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion, but wrote separately
to explain what he considered the “significant constitutional
problems” with the ICWA.73 Beginning with the historical
background of the Indian Commerce Clause during the drafting of
the Constitution,74 Justice Thomas explained that the history and the
text of the Clause do not grant Congress “plenary power over Indian
affair” but rather “conferred on Congress the much narrower power
to regulate trade with Indian tribes.”75
He therefore concluded that because the ICWA regulates Indian
child custody proceedings—not commerce—Congress lacked the
enumerated power to “support Congress’ intrusion into this area of
traditional state authority.”76 Therefore, “application of the ICWA to
these [state-court] child custody proceedings would be
unconstitutional.”77 Because Justice Thomas believed that the
majority’s interpretation of the relevant ICWA provisions and

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 2564–65.
Id. at 2564.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2564–65.
Id. at 2565 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2568–69.
Id. at 2567.
Id. at 2566.
Id. at 2571.

ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL

532

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/25/2014 4:07 PM

[Vol. 47:523

conclusion that those provisions did not apply to this case avoided
these constitutional problems, he concurred with the Court.78
C. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer joined the majority’s opinion, but made several
observations of potential issues that could arise in future ICWA cases
because of the Court’s opinion.79 First, he observed that there is a
risk that the majority’s interpretation of §§ 1912(d) and (f), which
excludes parents who never had custody of their children in the first
place, may unintentionally exclude too many categories of Indian
parents.80 While the majority’s interpretation of these provisions
contemplates the exclusion of absentee parents, the provisions may
now also be inapplicable to those parents who are involved in their
child’s life but may have never had physical custody of the child.81
Justice Breyer also warned that “[w]e should decide here no
more than is necessary” and cautioned against the Court’s extending
the statutory interpretation to hypothetical factual scenarios.82 Justice
Breyer’s opinion essentially acknowledged that while he concurs in
the result of this case because Veronica will be returned to her
adoptive parents, this result may have dangerous future
consequences.
D. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
In a short yet powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated
that while he joined Justice Sotomayor in her dissent, he had
different reasons for rejecting the majority’s restrictive interpretation
of the words “continued custody” in § 1912(f).83 He argued that
“there is no reason that ‘continued’ must refer to custody in the past
rather than custody in the future.”84 Justice Scalia, who joined the
majority opinion in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield85 and called it one of the most difficult decisions of his

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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career,86 added an additional thought to his Adoptive Couple opinion.
He noted that the majority “needlessly demean[ed] the rights of
parenthood” that were long respected by the common law.87 The best
interests of the child, he pointed out, are not in fact considered when
a baby is born; unless there is some controversy about custody, the
child ordinarily stays with his or her biological parents.88 Some
children, Justice Scalia said, might “be better off raised by someone
else,” but “there is no reason in law or policy to dilute that
protection” of parental rights that is inherent in having a biological
child.89
E. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
In her dissenting opinion and joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Scalia, Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of
turning the law upside down to reach the result it wanted—the
morally appealing result of denying an absent dad custody of the
daughter he gave away.90 Justice Sotomayor said the point of the law
was to keep Indian children with their parents and to make adoptions
outside the tribe less likely.91 She wrote that while “[t]he majority
may consider this scheme unwise . . . no principle of construction
licenses a court to interpret a statute with a view to averting the very
consequences Congress expressly stated it was trying to bring
about.”92 She further predicted that “the anguish this case has caused
will only be compounded by today’s decision.”93
V. ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the
parental rights of biological Indian parents in state court actions, a
majority of the Supreme Court concluded that none of the applicable
statutory provisions “creates parental rights for unwed fathers where

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Barnes, supra note 55.
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2574.
Id. at 2583.
Id. at 2586.

ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL

534

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/25/2014 4:07 PM

[Vol. 47:523

no such rights would otherwise exist.”94 This holding distorted the
ICWA’s text and disregarded the will of Congress.
A. The Court’s Interpretation of the ICWA Distorts the Text and
Ignores the Statute’s Legislative Purpose
While the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Adoptive Couple
attempts to prioritize the child by predicting the best long-term result
for Veronica,95 it does so by ignoring Congress’s intent as well as the
plain language of the ICWA.
First, the majority opinion reached the legally incorrect result
because it ignored the clear congressional findings and legislative
intent behind the ICWA’s enactment. Adoption proceedings, along
with most family law cases, are typically adjudicated in state court
and are governed by state common law.96 Congress enacted the
ICWA—an exception to this general rule97—to address the very
specific problem of the unwarranted removal of Indian children from
their biological parents.98 The ICWA thus “seeks to protect the rights
of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian
community and tribe in retaining its children in its society.”99 It does
so by establishing uniform federal standards to ensure that Indian
child welfare determinations are not based on “a white, middle-class
standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian
family.”100
Therefore, a court interpreting the ICWA’s text must do so in a
way that effectuates the legislative goal of keeping Indian children
with their biological parents, or at least within the Indian culture. The
Supreme Court failed to do so. Instead, a majority of the Justices
94. Id. at 2563 (majority opinion).
95. See id. at 2565 (stating that the ICWA was not meant to “put certain vulnerable children
at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian”).
96. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations [is] an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593–94 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”).
97. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557.
98. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2006) (“Congress finds . . . that there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or
are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”).
99. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 23 (1978).
100. Id. at 24.
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made a moral determination of what they believed was in Veronica’s
best interest—that she should be raised by the Capobiancos instead
of her noncustodial biological father—because Brown “abandoned”
his child “prior to birth and . . . never had custody” of his own
child.101 This is not the correct legal result.
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Court
stated that “the [ICWA’s] most important substantive requirement
imposed on state courts is that of § 1915(a), which, absent ‘good
cause’ to the contrary, mandates that adoptive placements be made
preferentially . . .” with an enumerated list of potential Indian
guardians.102 This is a logical connection between Congress’s intent
behind the statute—to keep Indian children within the Indian
community—and the location of this statutory provision as the
subsection listed first within a long set of requirements. The Court
ignored the logical structure and order of the statute by analyzing the
applicable provisions of the ICWA in reverse order. This “textually
backward reading,”103 placed more importance on the words
“continuing” and “breakup” in order to conform the text of the
statute to fit the majority’s desired outcome.
The plain text of the statute also leads to a different result.
Section 1912(f) contains a heightened burden of proof that must be
met before a court will approve the adoption of an Indian child: the
Indian parent’s continued custody of the Indian child would “result
in serious emotional or physical harm to her beyond a reasonable
doubt.”104 Congress’s inclusion of this high evidentiary threshold
demonstrates that the provisions of the ICWA must be interpreted as
high hurdles to overcome before an Indian child may be placed with
non-Indian adoptive parents.
B. The Potential Negative Consequences of the Court’s Opinion
The Court disregarded the clear legislative intent behind the
enactment of the ICWA and manipulated the statute’s plain language
to reach what the majority of Justices felt was the “morally correct”

101. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563. See also id. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(noting the “majority’s focus on [Brown’s] perceived parental shortcomings”).
102. 490 U.S. 30, 36–37 (emphasis added).
103. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2573 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
104. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 562–63 (S.C. 2012) (emphasis added).
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result. While the majority attempted to rationalize its opinion by
stating that this holding is limited to the facts of this particular
case,105 this will not prevent the unintended consequences of the
holding, particularly the issue of Indian children being removed from
their biological parents because state agencies (or in this case, the
U.S. Supreme Court) deemed the parents unfit.106
Indeed, as the dissent predicts, there is now a risk that the
majority’s interpretation of §§ 1912(d) and (f) will not apply to
biological parents who never had physical custody of their children,
but who have visitation rights or provide other financial and
emotional support.107 These parents will be precluded from the
protections Congress intended to afford them under the ICWA.
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer cautioned that “[w]e should
decide here no more than is necessary,” and also cautioned against
the Court extending the statutory interpretation to hypothetical
factual scenarios.108 But even Justice Breyer recognized that the
majority’s interpretation could exclude too many absentee Indian
fathers, and thus defeat the purpose and legislative intent behind the
ICWA: to prevent the removal of Indian children from their
biological parents and subsequent placement in non-Indian adoptive
or foster homes.109
There are already negative consequences arising from the
Court’s decision in this case, as demonstrated by the lower court
proceedings that have occurred since the Court remanded the case
back to the lower courts on June 25, 2013. On July 17, 2013, the
South Carolina Supreme Court, in accordance with the Court’s
interpretation of the ICWA, remanded the case to the “Family Court
for the prompt entry of an order approving and finalizing Adoptive
Couple’s adoption of [Veronica], and thereby terminating [Brown’s]
parental rights.”110 While the court also noted that “there is
absolutely no need to compound any suffering that Baby Girl may
105. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2563 n.8.
106. See Brief of Family Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents Birth
Father and Cherokee Nation at 14, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL
1308809, at *14; Stan Watts, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (1989).
107. 133 S. Ct. at 2572–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion).
110. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 54 (S.C. 2013).
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experience through continued litigation,”111 on July 22, 2013, Brown
filed a petition for rehearing with the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which the court denied.112
On September 3, 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted an
emergency stay to keep Veronica with Brown.113 But, on September
23, 2013, Brown turned over custody of Veronica to the
Capobiancos.114 Although Brown announced that he had dismissed
all pending custody claims to spare Veronica continued public
exposure,115 the legal saga continues. On November 1, 2013, the
Capobiancos filed a claim against Brown and the Cherokee Nation
seeking recovery of more than $1 million in costs accrued during the
custody proceedings.116 This drawn-out litigation demonstrates that
while the Supreme Court attempted to reach a result it felt was in
Veronica’s best interest, the decision is subjecting Veronica—and all
of the parties involved—to continuing turmoil. This cannot be what
is in Veronica’s “best interest.”117
VI. CONCLUSION
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme
Court issued what it felt was a “morally correct” result. But in
reality, the Court’s interpretation of the ICWA was a legally
incorrect, results-oriented holding that ignored the text and purpose
111. Id. at 53.
112. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 346–47 (S.C. 2013).
113. “Baby Veronica” Custody Case: Oklahoma Supreme Court Grants Stay to Keep Girl
with Biological Dad, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301201_162-57601079/baby-veronica-custody-case-okla-supreme-court-grants-stay-to-keep-girlwith-biological-dad/.
114. Robin Abcarian, Legal Battle Over Native American Girl Comes to a Poignant End,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-legal-battle-babyveronica-native-american-20130924,0,584905.story?page=1#axzz2nxOjf8pE.
115. “Baby Veronica” Dad Dusten Brown, Cherokee Nation Drop Fight for Custody Rights,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 10, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/baby-veronica-dad-dustenbrown-cherokee-nation-drop-fight-for-custody-rights/.
116. Adoptive Parents Sue Cherokee Nation, Dusten Brown for More Than $1M, NEWS9.COM
(Nov. 5, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://www.news9.com/story/23886301/adoptive-parents-sue-cherokeenation-dusten-brown-for-more-than-1m.
117. See Editorial Board, Indian Child Welfare Act May Need Some Limits, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/indian-child-welfare-act-may-needsome-limits/2013/04/15/8db00cae-a613-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (“Imagine one of
those wrenching custody cases in which every side seems to have the child’s interests at heart but
almost every fact is disputed. Many people—including the child in the middle of the fight—have
pain ahead of them, no matter the outcome.”).
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of the statute. The Court’s distorted and oversimplified interpretation
of the ICWA will likely lead to legal consequences for families
dealing with the already complex and emotionally turbulent adoption
and custody proceedings. These consequences are exemplified by the
harsh practical result of the Court’s decision—Veronica has twice
been separated from her families, first from the Capobiancos and
now from Brown, whom she lived with for nearly two years.118 She
is a true victim of this law.

118. Abcarian, supra note 114.

